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GOULDNER.S TRAGIC VISION  
James J. Chriss, Cleveland State University 
Abstract 
Classical literature, specifically ancient Greek philosophy and especially the study of 
Greek tragedy, is helpful in tracing out and understanding the transitions Alvin 
Gouldner made during his career as a sociologist. This article argues that a latent 
tragic orientation or vision existed during Gouldner's early eareer as a standout in 
the field of industrial sociology and that this tragic vision became manifest around 
1962 as Gouldner was developing more and more strident denunciations of establish-
ment sociology. Ibis case study of Gouldner's career teaches a valuable lesson about 
the importance of the tragic vision in helping sociologists to understand the limita-
tions of the scientific quest for knowledge. 
Sociology, which became established as a scientific discipline only as recently as the 
end of the nineteenth century, was heir to the Enlightenment vision of science and rea-
son. This Enlightenment vision, according to R. Bierstedt (1978), contained the follow-
ing elements or propositions: explanations based on reason and science were superior to 
those based on religion; all social phenomena could be explained via the application 
of the principles and methods of the natural sciences; and the confidence in the ability of 
reason to solve all problems meant that the perfectibility of humankind was now attain-
able and no longer merely a fanciful, utopian dream (see also Rundell 20m). 
By the 1940s most U.S. sociology departments had fully embraced and institutional-
ized these Enlightenment propositions, and the field's theorists and practitioners were 
busily constructing, both conceptually and organizationally, this burgeoning science of 
society (Luhmann 1982; Habermas 1984; Turner and Turner 1990). For example, because 
of his strengths in statistical technique and methodology, William Ogburn was hired by 
Columbia University's sociology program in 1928 in a departmental effort to position 
itself as the American leader of scientific sociology (Oberschall 1972; Bannister 1987; 
Chriss 2001).1 Thus, by the time Alvin W. Gouldner had arrived at Columbia in 1943 to 
begin work on his master's degree, scientific sociology was well-established not only as a 
result of Ogburn's influence but also, and perhaps even more importantly, because of 
Robert K. Merton's presence. 
Gouldner, who studied under Merton (for details, see Merton 1982), was a standout 
in the field of industrial sociology through the 1950s and into the early 1960s, but by 
1962 his commitment to the high modernism and positivism of scientific sociology came 
to an abrupt halt. In this article I make the case that Gouldner's turn toward a critical 
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and especially reflexive sociology occurred because he came to embrace a tragic vision 
of science and society that in many ways is deeply antithetical to Enlightenment 
assumptions and to the practice of "normal" science (Kuhn 1970). 
By the "tragic vision," I mean an approach to or perspective on life that emphasizes 
human frailty, the horrors of everyday existence, and the sheer unpredictability of life as 
we know it (Gouldner 1965; 1976, pp. 67~90). This tragic vision was originally developed 
in Greece during the fifth century B.C., primarily as represented in the poetry and plays 
of Greck tragic theater. In the next section, I discuss how the tragic vision is related to 
the scientific vision. 
TRAGEDY AND SCIENCE 
Over the years a number of authors (see especially Whitehead r1925] 1926; Frye 1957) 
have noted the proximity between the appearance of tragic theater and the occurrence 
of scientific revolutions during two specific time periods and places: the fifth century 
B.c. in Greece and the early seventeenth century in Europe.2 Tragic theater developed 
during the fifth century B.c. and shortly thereafter, with the rise of the Socratic and Pla-
tonic era, the establishment of academic philosophy occurred. Likewise in the early sev-
enteenth century, the end of the Renaissance ushered in the great tragedies of 
Shakespeare, which were followed shortly thereafter by the dawning of the Enlighten-
ment and the modern age of science (Munck 2000). Writing in 1925, Alfred North 
Whitehead ([1925]1926, p. 10) believed the rise of tragedy was merely a foreshadowing 
of science, in that both tragedy and science were of the same cloth, sharing the charac-
teristics of fate, remorselessness, determinism, and indifference: "Fate in Greek tragedy 
becomes the order of nature in modern thought." 
Michael Chayut (1999) suggests that both these periods were marked by a transition 
from "old myth" to science, two conflicting worldviews that simply cannot coexist. 
According to John F. Danby (1949), old myth is the dying Renaissance mythology repre-
sented by a traditional, hierarchical outlook on humanity and nature, while science is a 
rational, skeptical outlook representing a new empiricist and mechanistic science 
(Chayut 1999, p. 166). This is consistent with Friedrich Nietzsche's ([1872] 1956) view of 
the dialectical, oppositional relationship between tragedy and science. In essence, trag-
edy gives birth to an optimistic, theoretical, and scientific critical thought and rises to 
ascendancy through matricide. As the dialectic progresses, for tragedy to be reborn, sci-
ence must in its turn die out or wither away. We have witnessed this in thc contcmporary 
era, as sciencc has come undcr attack for, among othcr things, its fetish of quantification 
and its claims of presuppositionlessness and value-neutrality, as well as its alleged rac-
ism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, and Eurocentrism (for summaries, see Alatas 2001; 
Lemert 2001; Rogers 2001). It would appear, then, that this postmodernist environment 
of hyperskepticism toward science (Foucault 1979; Lyotard 1984; Maffesoli 1993) repre-
sents a fertile terrain for the return of the tragic vision. 
In the tradition of Greek theater, Shakespeare's King Lear is perhaps the exemplary 
tragedy. The plot line is built on the incompatibility between the two contradictory 
views of nature of old myth and science. One group of protagonists (King Lear, the 
Duke of Gloucester, Cordelia and their followers) holds to the old myth view of nature 
and reality, where nature is viewed as fluid, dynamic, and unstable (Chayut 1999; Danby 
1949). The group of villains led by Edmund, in contrast, is machiavellistic in orientation; 
they are of the age of scientific inquiry and industrial development, the age of the six-
teenth century and after (Danby 1949, p. 46). This group of villains is described as 
maehiavels because they are gifted in the mechanical manipulation of human nature, 
which has a direct lineage to the scientist's ability to manipulate physical nature. Indeed, 
as Danby (1949) suggests, in Edmund we have the fusing of two images: the political 
machiavel and the Renaissance scientist. 
King Lear is a tragic hero because he is surrounded on all sides by a new way of life, a 
culture that is foreign to him. As Nietzsche ([1872] 1956) suggests, every tragic hero 
derives his status from his embodiment of old myth in the form of the god Dionysus. All 
the celebrated figures of the Greek stage-Prometheus. Oedipus, and so on-are but 
masks of the original tragic hero, Dionysus (ChayutI999, p. 172). Dionysus is the god of 
wine and revelry but also the god of the theater, of masks and impersonation, of myriad 
selves (Storm 1998, p. 9). In Euripides's Bacchae (Bacchus being the Roman e4uivalent 
of Dionysus), Agave tears apart her own son, Pentheus, limb from limb, then takes his 
head and impales it on a stick for all the Theban citizenry to behold, thinking it to be the 
head of a lion. But she was mad, possessed by Bacchus, and, standing before her father 
Cadmus, she is brought to recognition that she had just killed her son. Agave laments, 
"Now, now I see: Dionysus has destroyed us all." 
It is often the case that tragic heroes' own sense of self and identity are torn apart, 
rent and scattered and, like King Lear or Agave, they are left to make their way through 
an alien and unsure world, if indeed they survive at all. As the god of wine, Dionysus 
assures the resurrection of the vine and the intoxication of the flesh in the orgiastic cele-
brations to his image. In this sense he is the god of ecstacy, the condition of transport 
beyond the self. But in addition to the power of generation. Dionysus also wields the 
power of destruction, delivering some individuals to ecstatic rapture and others to hor-
ror and madness (Storm 1998, p. 18). Nietzsche suggested that the advent of tragedy is 
dependent on the dialectic between two forces or movements, the Dionysiac (the art 
realm of intoxication, freeing the spirit from worldly constraints so as to accommo-
date an ecstatic communion with primal unity) and the Apollonian (the art realm of 
dream [the dream of reason], the rational and measured, the tempering that is necessary 
to return one to the "illusion" of individual selfhood after bouts of rapture) (Storm 
1998, p. 22). 
PHENOMENOLOGY, POSITIVISM, AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 
Having taken note of the dialectical relation between the appearance of tragedy and sci-
ence, we may conjecture as to the impact that certain texts in classical studies-primarily 
those dealing with ancient Greek philosophy, Greek theater and tragedy, as well as sec-
ondary analysis of these works by Nietzsche and other classical scholars-had on 
Gouldner. Before we explore this topic in more detail in the next section, we must first 
note that, as the sociology of knowledge suggests, both direct experience of the social 
world and exposure to texts (or other scholars' ideas) contribute to social scientists' the-
oretical orientations and paradigmatic worldviews (Chriss 1999a, p. 110).3 
Texts often work merely to ratify a preexisting set of assumptions the reader holds 
about the world, about knowledge, about values, and so forth. In this sense, theorists 
often gravitate toward systems of ideas that resonate with their own personal proclivi-
ties, that comport with the Weltanschaaung of a theory group. This is what Arthur O. 
Lovejoy (1936) described as a "metaphysical pathos" endemic to science and philoso-
phy. Early in his career, at the time firmly ensconced in the normal science paradigm of 
industrial sociology, Gouldner (1955) chastised Talcott Parsons, Philip Selznick, and 
others for having an overly pessimistic view of bureaucracy. This pessimistic view of for-
mal organization was established both by Max Wcber (his notion of the "iron cage" of 
bureaucracy) and by Robert Michels (1915; his notion of the "iron law of oligarchy"). 
Gouldner believed that sociologists such as Parsons and Selznick embraced the pessi-
mistic view of bureaucracy not because of any systcmatic, analytical inspection of the 
idea per se, but because it was congruent with the mood or sentiments of these theorists 
and of the era more generally (Wilson 1971). Indeed, much that had been written in the 
field of organizational sociology up to that time (1955), according to Gouldner, tended 
to blindly follow the masters' voices (Michels and especially Weber), and the metaphys-
ical pathos (pessimism and fatalism) of their ideas insinuated itself into the majority of 
contemporary writings. In essence, Gouldner argued that organizational studies had 
taken a wrong turn in embracing the notion that bureaucracy was inevitable and patho-
logical rather than potentially humane and liberating. Further, this delusion was caused 
by sociologists' inattention to the empirical realities of organizations. 
During his early period of immersion in the "normal" science paradigm of industrial 
sociology (1953 through approximately 1962; see Chriss 1999a; 2001), then, Gouldner 
drew upon Lovejoy and the sociology of knowledge as a way of critiquing fellow sociol-
ogists who were allowing extracognitive factors to encroach upon their "scientific" 
work. Indeed, in some ways this strategy is similar to thc phenomenological critique of 
science. Phenomcnology suggests that standard sociological concepts such as role, role-
making, status, and reference groups develop in parallel to the truths, realities, and lived 
convictions of the everyday life (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Gouldner 1975). The 
unthematized horizons of the lifeworld provide the backdrop for the everyday life and, 
as a result, social scientists' tacit knowledge of the social world is inexorably intertwined 
with their attcmpts to thematize these background understandings in the form of sci-
entific theory (Chriss 1999b, pp. 68-71). 
Both positivism-which Gouldner embraced in his early period-and phenomenol-
ogy believe that a meaningful distinction can be made between science and nonscience. 
In comparison to positivism, however, phenomenology envisions a "softer" or "fuzzier" 
boundary between the two insofar as it is possible to transcend the tacit understandings 
of everyday life through the bracketing of the "natural attitude" (Ferguson 2001).4 This 
is a difficult task, however, in that only highly-trained phenomenologists are able to sus-
pend belief in the taken-for-granted world through the methodology of bracketing, 
thereby alerting scientists to those aspects of unthematized existence that are bound up 
in their thematized objects of scientific inquiry. Phenomenology, then, is in a position to 
help scientists understand or explain certain pretheoretical phenomena that, as mem-
bers of an ongoing, everyday lifeworld, confront them as subjectively experienced 
aspects of their reality. By doing this, phenomenologists and phenomenologically-
trained scientists are better able to direct their attention to the primacy of experience, 
thereby returning "to the things themselves" (Tiryakian 1973, p. 208). 
Positivism of course is equally concerned with phenomena, with the "things them-
selves," but goes even further than phenomenology in presuming that, by following the 
protocols of the research process, contaminating aspects of the everyday life-supersti-
tion, ideology, dogma, hopes, aspirations, dreams, values, and personal proclivities-can 
be held in abeyance by scientists, thereby producing "objective" or "value-free" knowl-
edge. In this sense, positivism seeks to go beyond mere "description" or "understand-
ing" of phenomena, instead providing causal "explanations" of these phenomena. Since 
Immanuel Kant believed that metaphysical knowledge of things-in-themselves (nou-
mena) is not possible, he made human transcendental ego the measure of all things. Fur-
ther, as David Bidney (1973, p. 110) explains, "In denying that things-in-themselves can 
be the object of empirical, scientific knowledge, Kant was responsible for the alleged 
antithesis of science and metaphysics or ontology-a thesis which he shares with the 
later positivism of Comte." 
The interesting thing about Gouldner's embrace of positivism during his early, indus-
trial sociology period is that there is a flirtation with the phenomenological critique of 
science-by way of Lovejoy and the sociology of knowledge-without there being the 
"pathos" or excess baggage of self-reflexivity that signals the tragic vision more gener-
ally. As mentioned earlier, Gouldner's immersion in certain texts in philology, ancient 
Greek philosophy, and linguistics beginning in the early 1960s acted essentially as a 
"trigger" that unleashed the full potential of the tragic vision that, like the protagonist 
in a Greek drama who reaches the state of recognition, brought Gouldner to recognize 
the deficiencies of, and paradoxes contained within, normal "establishment" sociology 
and science. In the next section I shall trace out the genesis and growth of Gouldner's 
tragic vision. 
GOUlDNER'S TRAGIC TURN 
As we have seen, although Gouldner (1955; 1956; 1959a; 1959b; 1960) had been critical 
of Parsons's structural functionalism and organizational scholars in general for their 
metaphysical pathos of pessimism concerning modern bureaucracy since at least the 
mid-1950s, these criticisms were nevertheless written in a tolerant, scholarly tone that 
reflected Gouldner's continuing immersion in what he would later come to deride as 
"establishment" sociology. For example, in his famous 1960 paper on the norm of reci-
procity, Gouldner (1960, p. 171) still clung to a positivistic view of science: "The task of 
the sociologist, in this regard, parallels that of the physicist who seeks to identify the 
basic particles of matter, the conditions under which they vary, and their relations to one 
another." This contrasts sharply with the position Gouldner (1972. p.15) took a decade 
later, when he was becoming more sympathetic to hermeneutics, this being a method in 
which "the theorist is regarded as being more like an art or architectural critic than a 
physicist." Indeed, this represents quite a radical transition from a physicalist to a sym-
bolist frame of reference (Chriss 2000a).5 
Gouldner's tragic vision arose shortly after his 1960 reciprocity paper was published. 
It was nurtured and given form beginning in the late fifties, which represents the end of 
his industrial sociology phase, and then flowered fully in 1965 with the publication 
of Enter Plato, a study of ancient Greek philosophy in which Gouldner sought to trace 
the origins of modem social theory. Gouldner wanted to understand how and why Plato 
attempted (in The Republic) to fashion a new rationalized approach to social explana-
tion for purposes of building a just society upon the foundation of his (Plato's) "eternal 
forms." This new approach for making sense of the human condition and governing the 
lives of people sought to settle once and for all the meanings of such contested terms as 
virtue, justice, goodness, and health through Socratic dialogue (the Greek dialectic), 
philosophical reflection, and thc sheer force of reason. 
How did the theory bchind Plato's Republic arise out of the "old" way of making 
sense of the human condition, as represented in Greek tragedy? As we havc seen, the 
major theme or form in Greek (and later Shakespearean) tragedy is the staging of a per-
formance in which a hero or protagonist faces obstacles in a tireless search for truth(s), 
only to eventually fail, the failure or shortcoming serving to illustrate the irreducible 
richness of human valuc that attends to that very same heroic attempt to order the 
world. As Christopher Rocco (1997, p. 23) explains, 
The Republic argues that a polis and a life can be propcrly ordered by knowledge of 
the Good so as to avoid the tragic failures of human progress adumbrated by Sopho-
cles and suffered by his Oedipus. The Republic seems to banish, not only tragedy and 
the tragic poets, but the very conflicts born of intense human commitment to irrecon-
cilable values. 
Tragedy argues that one learns what is meaningful and important about the social world 
only through the intimate contextualization of persons and their relationships as they 
rise to victory and then fall to defeat, and eventually suffer the greatest human tragedy, 
death (Gouldner 1965). There are no universal truths "out there," no "eternal forms" 
waiting to be discovered by persons trained in a specific method or holding a particular 
epistemology or ontology. In this sense, tragedy is akin to hermeneutics or empathic 
undcrstanding (Verstehen), often employing a qualitative, case study approach whose 
aim is "thick description" (Geertz 1(73) of various aspects of social reality. Conversely, 
the Platonic/Socratic program of philosophy and dialogue is akin to the positivistic 
search for law-like generalizations about the social world, the aim of which is causal 
explanation of the factors associated with the production of those social phenomena 
under investigation. Whereas tragedy argucd that what was tragic about the human con-
dition was its utter randomness and unpredictability, the new orientation of the Socratic 
era saw the universe as formed and limited, not chaotic and infinite. Tndeed, science and 
philosophy by the time of Plato 
gives the assurance which the questing fifth-century mind increasingly lacked, that 
the seemingly infinite variety of the world is not in fact wild and ungoverned but 
open to understanding and hence to control. Control would in effect be simply the 
recognition and following of natural laws that exist in any case. (Finley 1966, p. 93) 
Gouldner became familiar with the writings of ancient Greek philosophers and tra-
gedians, as well as a broader secondary classical literature, not only as a result of his 
work on Enter Plato. Three years earlier, in 1962, Gouldner, along with coauthor Rich-
ard A. Peterson, published a peculiar little book entitled Notes on Technology and the 
Moral Order. In preparation for this book, Gouldner spent time in workshops on quan-
titative methods and the newest statistical techniques, including factor analysis. Through 
factor analysis, Gouldner and Peterson (1962) hoped once and for all to settle a pcrsis-
tent problem within functional analysis, namely, its penchant for tautology. In conceptu-
alizing the social system as a system of interdependent parts in which all parts and 
subsystems affected all the othcr parts and subsystems, functionalism explained evcry-
thing, thereby explaining nothing. 
Factor analysis promised a way of holding constant certain key variables in a system 
of multiple variables or factors, thereby allowing determination of the relative "loading" 
or influence of each variable of interest. Gouldner and Peterson drew their data from 
the Human Relations Area Files, which contained information on seventy-one pre-
industrial societies. They grouped thc data into various factors, such as factor L (lincal-
ity), factor SD (sex dominance), factor T (level of technology), and factor A (thcir mea-
sure of morality which they dubbed "norm-sending"). The A in factor A stood for 
Apollonianism, which Gouldner and Peterson appropriated directly from Nietzsche's 
([1872]1956) study of tragedy and the genealogy of morals. As Gouldner and Peterson 
(1962, p. 51) explain, 
There is in Apollonianism a development of norm-sending institutions such as cere-
monial or ritual and of codified laws, as well as of groups and roles such as a powerful 
chieftainship, authoritative judges. a restricted council, and an organized priesthood 
bulwarked by beliefs in the attractiveness of the afterlife. 
As mentioned earlier, Nietzsche had suggested that ancient Greek society and certain 
other societies of antiquity were charactcrized by a Dionysian complex emphasizing 
the pleasures of the flesh, rapture and intoxication, a tragic view of the world, and the 
acceptance of the terrors and horrors of existence. In contrast, latcr morc rationalized 
societies were labeled Apollonian, whose primary characteristic was "impulse contro\." 
Some of the factors of the Apollonian ideal type included freedom from all extravagant 
urges, the stressing of cognitive modes of experience, reason, knowledge, and science, 
and the admonition to "know thyself." Gouldner and Peterson found that societies that 
scored high on factor A also tended to score high on factor T, technology. 
Although Gouldner seemed to have arrived at a new level of sophistication regarding 
functional analysis and an improved ability to judge the relative importance of variables 
in contributing to certain features of the social system-here, the link between technol-
ogy and morality-he also realized the extraordinary irony and incongruity of calling 
upon Nietzsche to help order his data and provide corroboration for his thesis. Indeed, 
at this point Gouldner has one leg in the old myth camp of the Dionysiac tragic vision 
and the other leg in the camp of the Apollonian scientific vision. As Gouldner and 
Peterson (1962, p. 32) state, 
We arc unhappily aware that, at this point, we may lose some of our remaining read-
ers. We may lose those who feel that tainted philosophers have no place in a pure 
social science, or those whose liberal views are offended by Nietzsche's seeming anti-
Semitism. or those who simply cannot bear the presumably gross incongruity of jux-
taposing philosophical poetry and statistical analysis. 
Like oil and water, the tragic and scientific visions simply do not mix well. At this critical 
juncture, Gouldner opted out of the positivistic worldview, gave up most if not all pre-
tenses of doing "science." and from approximately 1962 forward unleashed a virtual 
tirade against all scientiftc systems of thought that lacked the reflexivity to peer into and 
confront thcir own anomalies and contradictions. This is seen, for example, in Gould-
ner's blistering attacks on (1) the doctrine of objectivity and value neutrality in science 
(Gouldner 1962; see Hammersley [2000] for a summary and critique of Gouldner's posi-
tion), (2) the secrets of organizations and the pathological consequences of these for 
social service agencies in particular (Gouldner 1963), (3) partisanship for the dispos-
sessed and downtrodden in society, especially to the extent that research on such popula-
tions is funded by the welfare state (Gouldner 1(68), (4) the sociological establishment 
(Gouldner 1970), and of course (5) Marxism (Gouldner ]974a; 1974b; 1977-1978; 1980; 
1(85). 
REFLEXIVITY AND THE NEW CLASS: THE FINAL TRAGEDY 
Amidst all this seeming negativism and loss of certitude about science, Gouldner still 
retained one slim thread to conventional science: his program of reflexive sociology. 
Reflexivity in general refers to "that which turns back upon, or takcs account of, itself or 
a person's self" (Holland 1999, p. 464). The problem of reflexivity for sociology, accord-
ing to Kieran M. Bonner (2001, p. 267) "concerns the ability of the inquirer to take 
responsibility for what one says while simultaneously being able to say something sub-
stantial about the phenomenon or object of inquiry." 
This version of reflexivity in sociological theory is a direct reaction against the posi-
tivist dictum that the voice or persona of the theorist should be muted and systemati-
cally excised from the theoretical system (Hertz 1997). For example, even today many 
scientific journals admonish authors to avoid the use of the personal pronoun "I" in 
their writings. As a collective enterprise, science utilizes such conventions as blind peer 
review to ensure that ftndings reflect not merely the idiosyncratic observations of an 
inquisitive mind, however gifted the author is or is perceived to be, but instead the 
shared wisdom of a consensual community of scholars. This traditional view of science 
was handed down to us from the time of Plato, whose own philosophical system was 
built on the assumption that knowledge is a disinterested "master" vision of formal 
objects (Sandywell1996a, p. 126). Reflexivity in the social sciences turns away from this 
feature of Platonism as well as from Descartes's subject-object dualism, moving from 
the "individual cogito of epistemology and the rational 'agent' of social theory to the 
embodied, socially situated person-in relation" (Sandywell 1996a, p. 377).6 This is seen 
clearly in Gouldner's (1970, p. 25) description of the major aims of his own version of 
reflexive sociology: 
RetJexivity 
1st Order 2nd and Higher Order 
(Reflection) (Radical Reflexivity) 
------~~- ----'-'----I 
-REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 
Present TRAGEDY -FEMINIST THEORY 
-ETHNOMETHODOLOGY 
Authorial Voice -t---------+---
Absent POSITIVISTIC DECONSTRUCTION 
SCIENCE (,'death of the subject") 
FIGURE 1. TYPES OF EXPLANATORY SYSTEMS BY LEVEL OF REFLEXIVITY  
AND PRESENCE/ABSENCE OF AUTHORIAL VOICE  
The sociologist's task today is not only to see people as they see themselves, nor to 
see themselves as others see them; it is also to see themselves as they see other 
people. What is needed is a new and heightened self-awareness among sociologists, 
which would lead them to ask the same kinds of questions about themselves as they 
do about taxicab drivers or doctors, and to answer them in the same ways. Above all, 
this means that we must acquire the ingrained habit of viewing our own beliefs as we 
would those held by others. 
Ironically enough, however, the Apollonian decree of "know thyself" through dialogue 
and philosophical reflection is central as well to Gouldner's program of reflexivity. In 
this sense, Gouldner's embrace of "cognitive rationality" (Parsons and Platt 1973) 
shares with Plato the belief in the beauty and dignity of thought (Finley 1966, p. 97). The 
new class of intellectuals (and to a lesser extent the technical intelligentsia) is the bearer 
of cognitive rationality in the form of thc culture of critical discourse by which members 
of this class attempt to explain or understand thc modern world (Gouldner1976;] 979). 
Gouldner (1979, p. 28) describes the culture of critical discourse as 
an historically evolved set of rules, a grammar of discourse, which (1) is concerned to 
justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justification does not proceed by invoking 
authorities, and (3) prefers to elicit the voluntary consent of those addressed solely 
on the basis of arguments adduced. 
Hcnce, the culture of critical discourse, as the language of science, is concerned with jus-
tifying one's claims, not with recourse to the status of the speaker, but through a rea-
soned dialogue between interlocutors who agree in principle that all assertions are open 
to discussion and problematization. Although voiceless, unlike tragedy (which includes 
the voice of the speaker or author in its explanatory schema), the culture of critical dis-
course (positivism) is reflexive in that it is open to examination of its own talk and it is 
willing to talk about the value of talk (Figure 1). The culture of critical discourse is, in 
essence, the deep or latent structure of the common ideology of the new class (Gouldner 
1979, p. 28). 
It is in the nature of science to leave nothing to tacit understanding but to investigatt: 
anything that comes to the attention of an inquisitive mind. Armed with the protocols of 
scientific research and assuming that the world can be known through a diligent applica-
tion of the steps of the research process overseen by blind peer review, the culture of 
critical discourse nevertheless encounters problems of its own. Since all assertions are 
open to challenge, the culture of critical discourse must also engage in autocritique, and 
critique of that autocritique, and so on, in essence putting its hands around its own 
throat and seeing how long it can squeeze. "There is an unending regress in it, a poten-
tial revolution in permanence; it embodies that unceasing restlessness and 'lawlessness' 
that the ancient Greeks first called anomos and that Hegel had called the 'bad infinity'" 
(Gouldner 1979, p. 60). 
Science believes the complexity of the social world can be tamed by a sober applica-
tion of reason monitored and checked via the collectivity of fellow scientists sharing the 
culture of critical discourse as their special speech variant. We see then that science 
requires the participation of like-minded others-especially as Plato conceptualized this 
by way of dialogue or the Greek dialectic-who negotiate the conditions of their exis-
tence and who generate knowledge through a reasoned search for "truth." Tragedy, on 
the other hand. depicts the tragic hero as opting to act unilaterally when confronted 
with the polycentrism and complexity of the world (Ramos Torre 1999). In Sophocles's 
Oedipus Tyrannos, for example, Ocdipus proclaims himself an independent agent free 
of fate and history and, being thus self-made and self-generating, he is able to see the 
world rationally. But as 1. Peter Euben (1997, p. 116) points out, in fact Oedipus's 
"knowledge comes with ignorance, and so the meaning of his acts rcmains bifurcated in 
a way he only comes to understand in the scene where, significantly enough, he blinds 
himself." 
Gouldner as tragic hero is similarly "blinded" when he comes upon the realization 
that reflexivity as science's last great hope is also deeply and mortally flawcd. It seems 
that no matter how hard science tries, its emphasis on rellexivity by way of the opera-
tional rules of the culture of critical discourse will always lead to the dead end of self-
refutation and self-negation that the tragic vision knows and understands all too well. 
Tragedy, then. is the latent or deep structure of science as a going concern, ready to 
break out from latency whenever someone like Gouldner, or Max Horkheimer and 
Theodor Adorno ([1944] 1972; sec also Connerton 1980) before him, decides to push 
reflexivity to its upper limit. This realization of the bifurcated and dualistic nature of the 
tragic hero gives us a new model of the social actor in contemporary social science, 
namely homo tragicus, whom Ramon Ramos lorre (1999) argues has supplanted earlier 
actor models such as homo specularis (from Adam Smith), homo rationalis (from eco-
nomics and utilitarianism), and even homo moralis (from the Durkheimian tradition). 
CONClUSION: TRAGEDY'S LESSONS 
Gouldncr's criticism and eventual abandonment of conventional positivistic sociology, 
and his later flirtation with Marxism which he found equally problematic because of its 
lack of reflexivity and its tendency to lapse into regimes of terror, can actually be seen as 
an empirical instance of a generalized tendency in science and philosophy toward the 
production of "nightmare theory" (Gouldner 1980; Chriss 1999a). Gouldner (1980, p. 
380) suggests that every theoretical system has a caged, unartieulated, and repressed 
version of the theory struggling to get out. In effect, all theories share the nightmare 
that the caged system will break out. 
As much as anything, Gouldner's program of reflexive sociology was an attempt to 
alert theorists to the hidden or tacit dimensions of their theories. Gouldner's (1980, pp. 
380-389) discussion of "nightmare Marxism" was the culmination of his analysis of the 
hidden, indeed paradoxical, dimensions of Marxism residing in its infrastructure. 
Specifically, Marxism was never adequately reflexive enough to account for its own ori-
gins. In other words, it could not answer the question: How could the intelligentsia, most 
of whose members come from privileged social class strata, elude their own social being 
to give expression to the consciousness of the proletariat? This contradicts the technical 
level of Marxism that argues that social location gives rise to consciousness, to a particu-
lar way of seeing and understanding the world. This garbled account of the origins of 
Marxism points to weaknesses in the entire Marxist analytic. according to Gouldner, 
and partially accounts for the nightmarish regimes of terror (Gouldner 1977-1978) that 
emerged under critical Marxism in places such as Russia. Cuba, China, East Germany, 
Yugoslavia, and elsewhere. 
Not only Marxism but also all nonreftexive theories have nightmare versions waiting 
to break out from latency when conditions are favorable. A theory's nightmare arises as 
well out of the repressive work the thcory must do in order to draw distinctions between 
itself and competing perspectives. But in so doing, each theory must also address criti-
cisms and challenges emanating from within its own borders. In similar fashion, having 
been founded in a critique of traditional society and cultural arrangements, sociology 
finds itself involved in constant internecine tighting, as versions of emancipatory sociol-
ogy arise to challenge, and attempt to break out from the shadow of, the currently dom-
inant version of sociology that some critics may come to perceive as being overly 
beholden to some oppressive power structure (for example, the kowtowing by 
rcsearchers to the welfare state as an important source of their funding; see Lemert 
]995, pp. 1-10; O'Ncill 1995). Gouldncr's work in sociology, then, can he understood as 
the articulation of the nightmare versions of existing theories that, because of either 
their lack of reflexivity or their outright desire not to admit openly to the discrepant or 
self-refutational implications of their own ideas, otherwise tend to be silenced, obfus-
cated, or systematically glossed over. All theories, whether structuralism, feminism, 
Marxism, functionalism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, dramaturgy, ethnomethod-
ology, network theory, or rational choice theory to name a few, have their repressed 
nightmares, their systematic silences concealed with a gloss. 
Sociology's nightmare-its tragedy-is the fact that its own critique of conventional 
or establishment sociology folds back on itself as sociology gains more legitimation and 
is accepted by society as a source of insights about the pathologies of modernity. This 
tendency toward self-critique and even self-refutation is what John O'Neill (1995, pp. 
188-189) descrihes as the inherent limitation of sociological knowledge, as embodied 
and articulated in and through the culture of critical discourse. It is what Gouldner 
(1976) described as the dark side of the dialectic, or anomos, or the "bad infinity." This is 
the home of tragedy. The tragic vision has always understood that the quest for knowl-
edge involves the solving of certain paradoxes and riddles only to generate more ques-
tions and more ambiguities as a result of that seeming step forward toward greater 
enlightenment and rationality. Euben's (1997, p. 134) discussion of the ambiguous con-
clusion to Sophocles's Oedipus Tyrannos is especially apposite here: 
Given the play's stance toward the riddles it dramatizes and the way it itself becomes 
riddling, this ambiguous ending is hardly surprising. Indeed, it would be strange if 
there were one integrating conclusion that answered all the questions raised by the 
play. If we are, as the play suggests, caught up in a web of local meanings that neces-
sarily leave us riddles to ourselves, if not to others, then reducing the play to a single 
term would endorse what it seems to warn against. 
Euben further suggests that, if Oedipus were to have an obvious conclusion, it would 
diminish the play's ability to disturb the alliance of reason, method, order, and progress 
that are the hallmarks-or rather the conceit-of science. Our unbridled optimism 
about the power of science to deliver better and more useful knowledge about the social 
world than ever before has blinded us from recognizing that every success of sociology 
(political science in Euben's case) has contained a failure. Indeed, the tragic vision 
teaches us that every way of seeing is also a way of not seeing, every way of knowing a 
way of not knowing. 
Gouldner's tragic sensibility led him to the ultimate painful conclusion that the new 
class of intellectuals were a flawed class and that their culture of critical discourse and 
method of reflexivity generated as many paradoxes and dead ends as they hoped to 
solve. In addition, Gouldner's tragic vision informs us that even theories with noble and 
humanitarian aims, such as Marxism's promise of uniting theory and practice via the 
elimination of oppression and subjugation by one class at the hands of another, have 
dark sides, nightmares lying in wait in the theory's infrastructure (Chriss 2000b). 
Hence, Gouldner's earnest warning, informed first by a latent and then a manifest 
tragic vision or orientation, was for social scientists to understand the limitations (the 
"bad news") of any quest for knowledge and ultimate "truths," to learn from that bad 
news, and to use it to improve both their own theorizing and, potentially, the human 
condition more generally. 
NOTES 
*For providing helpful comments on various versions of this talk and article, I wish to thank 
Barry Sandywell, Richard Sennett, Ramon Ramos Torre, and Silvia Pedraza. 
1. Indeed, Bannister (1987, p. 161) points out that Ogburn's vision for a scientific sociology 
included the utilization of a "wholly colorless literary style" by which the author's voice would be 
rendered invisible or irrelevant. I will return to this issue of authorial voice and the myth of silent 
authorship (Charmaz and Mitchell 1997) shortly. 
2. There exists of course a vast scholarly literature on tragic theater, Greek tragedy. and Greek 
thought more generally. Some of the writings Tconsulted include Chayut (1999), Danby (1949), 
Finley (1966), Glieksberg (1963), Goff (1995), Gouldner (1965; 1969; 1976), Kaufmann (1968), 
Maffesoli (1993), Nietzsche ([1872J 1956), Padel (1992; 1995), Pickard-Camhridge (1962). Ramos 
Torre (1999), Rehm (1992), Rocco (1997), Sandywell (1996b; 1996c), Sennett (1994). Steiner 
(1996), and Storm (199S). 
3. Deconstructionists do not share the view that one can make a meaningful distinction 
between the world and texts. As Lehmann (1993. p. 6) observes, "Deconstruction posits that there 
is no difference between the world and the text because there is only difference: the world is like a 
text; the world is a text; the world is textual. And there is no 'outside the text"; opposites are the 
same, all oppositions are equal, 'there is only difference.''' 
4. As Schutz and Luekmann (1973, p. 4) explain, "In the natural attitude, Talways find myself 
in a world which is for me taken for granted and self-evidently 'real.' T was horn into it and I 
assume that it existed before me. It is the unexamined ground of everything given in my experi-
ence, as it were, the taken-for-granted frame in which all the problems which I must overcome are 
placed." 
5. This idea of frame of reference draws primarily from Parsons (1937; Parsons, Bales, and 
Shils 1953) and Klausner (1982). Theorists working from within a physicalist (or objectivist or 
materialist) frame of reference are employing a conceptual scheme that assumes that the objects 
of study arc located within a spatiotemporal framework, emphasizing that these objects can be 
located in space and time relative to other objects. The spatiotemporaJ framework of classical 
mechanics is the paradigmatic example here (Parsons 1937, p. 28). On the other hand, theorists 
working from within a symbolist (or subjectivist or idealist) frame of reference place objects of 
analysis within an interpretive framework that emphasizes the meaning such objects have for 
actors within a situation. As Munch (1992, p. 244) suggests, a symbolist framework emphasizes 
meaning construction, norms, expressions, cognitions, and actions guided by symbols. 
n. Terminologically, we may avoid further confusion by noting that traditional positivistic sci-
ence engages in a "first-order" reflexivity that is more akin to simple "reflection" (Sandywell 
199ha). First-order reflexivity, or reflection. occurs naturally in everyday life without humans nec-
essarily being aware that they are acting reflexively. For example, the human self is developed out 
of routine social interaction as we sec ourselves in the mirror of others' appraisals of us (Cooley 
1902; Mead 1934). Normal science is reflective in the sense that theorists work with and develop 
ideas as they reflect upon the nature of their world. "Second-order" reflexivity is "meta-" in the 
sense that it involves thinking about thinking and can become more and more radical as it is pos-
sible to think about thinking about thinking ad infinitum (Wiley 1994, pp. 83-89). Gouldner con-
fronted this infinite regress in his own reflexive sociology; another form of radical reflexivity 
appears in ethnomethodology (Pollner 1991). (See Figure 1.) 
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